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I. INTRODUCTION 
I welcome the opportunity to discuss the laws affecting U.S.-
Canadian trade because I think these laws have a critical role in the 
future course of U.S.-Canadian trade relations. In this presentation, 
I would like to review recent trade law developments affecting U.S.-
Canadian trade flows. Specifically, I would like to cover: (1) the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1 (2) the Agreement with 
Canada Concerning Automotive Products, 2 and (3) several provi-
sions of U.S. law which directly affect U .S.-Canadian trade. Before 
beginning this survey, I would like to make some general comments 
about the overall economic setting. The events of 1975 have placed 
considerable pressure on the international trading system. The 
world is just now recovering from its most severe economic recession 
since the 1930's. The recession was marked by the first annual re-
duction in the volume of world trade since World War II, a reduction 
of six percent in 1975.3 Fortunately, the mistakes of the 1930's, 
competitive devaluations, beggar-thy-neighbor tariff hikes, and pro-
liferation of nontariff barriers, for example, were not repeated. This 
achievement is a tribute to the international legal and financial 
institutions which have been erected since World War II to deal with 
international economic problems. 
Canada did not escape the effects of the international recession. 
Real Gross National Product stagnated, unemployment rose, and 
Canada's balance of trade position worsened with both the United 
States and the rest of the world. 4 In most years, Canada exports 
more than it imports, but in 1975, Canada registered a global trade 
deficit of $1.7 billion and a bilateral deficit with the United States 
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1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, done Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3 (1948), 
T.I .A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N .T.S. 187 (effective Jan. 1, 1948)[hereinafter cited as GATI]. 
2. Agreement with Canada Concerning Automotive Products, done Jan . 16, 1965, 
[1966] 1 U.S.T. 1372, T.l.A.S. No. 6093 (effective Sept. 16, 1966)[hereinafter cited as Auto-
motive Products Agreement]. 
3. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 10 (1976) . 
4. Id. at 159, and Statistics Canada Daily, Feb. 27, 1976, at 2, 7. 
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of $1.9 billion.5 Both exports and imports rose to record levels, but 
exports (up 2.1 percent from 1974 to $32.9 billion) rose more slowly 
than imports (up 9.1 percent from 1974 to $34.6 billion).6 The deteri-
oration of $2.5 billion in Canada's global trade balance from 1974 
to 1975 is largely the result of the fact that the recession in the 
United States preceded that in Canada and was more severe and 
prolonged. As a result, the U.S. demand for Canadian goods fell 
sooner and to a greater degree than did Canadian demand for U.S. 
goods. Since Canada is still largely dependent upon primary goods 
exports, which tend to fluctuate strongly over the business cycle but 
with a long time lag, its exports still have not recovered their normal 
growth rate. 
Despite the recession, the United States and Canada continued 
as each other's largest trading partner. U.S. exports to Canada, 
$23.6 billion in 1975, are 22 percent of total U.S. exports, while 
Canada's exports to the United States, $21.5 billion in 1975, are 66 
percent of Canada's global exports.7 It follows that economic events 
and policies in either country have important effects upon the econ-
omy just across the border. These events and policies in turn are 
strongly influenced by national laws and international agreements. 
II. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 
At the international level, the most important multilateral 
agreement is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).8 
The GATT is essentially a contract in which nations have agreed 
on a system of rules designed to coordinate national trade policies 
for the purpose of liberalizing trade. The GATT does not supersede 
existing national legislation.9 The GATT is based on the concept 
that tariffs should be the only method used to regulate trade and 
that these tariffs should be gradually reduced through trade nego-
tiations, thereby permitting freer trade. In its 28 years, the GATT 
has been the framework for six rounds of trade negotiations through 
which the average tariff level among industrialized nations has been 
5. MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY, TRADE AND COMMERCE, CANADIAN STATISTICAL REVIEW, March 
1976, at 99-100. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. at 99; U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, March 1976, at 34, 
table B2. 
8. GAIT, supra note 1. The GAIT has never been submitted to the U.S. Senate for its 
advice and consent. It is, however, a valid executive agreement. 
9. See note 82 infra and accompanying text. 
2
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 4, No. 2 [1977], Art. 4
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol4/iss2/4
1976-77] U .S.-Canadian Trade 339 
reduced to about seven percent on dutiable items. 10 The seventh 
round, the Tokyo Round, is now underway in Geneva. In this round, 
negotiations are focused on tariffs; on nontariff measures such as 
antidumping and countervailing duties laws, internal taxes, and 
quantitative restrictions; and on improving the framework for inter-
national trade. 11 At the economic summit meeting in Rambouillet 
in December 1975, a commitment was made to complete the nego-
tiations in 1977 .12 
In these negotiations, new techniques are being used to negoti-
ate further trade liberalization. In the field of tariffs, progress is 
being made toward agreement on a tariff negotiating formula. The 
Kennedy Round, conducted from 1964 to 1967, marked the first 
successful use of an automatic tariff reduction formula. 13 In the 
Kennedy Round, agreement was reached on a linear tariff reduction 
of 50 percent, and negotiations proceeded on the basis of exceptions 
lists. 14 The net result was an overall reduction in tariffs of about 36 
percent on industrial products. 15 
In the Tokyo Round, an attempt is being made to accommodate 
the interests of those who favor this sort of straight linear device as 
well as those who favor harmonization, a concept involving larger 
percentage reductions for products with higher tariffs and smaller 
reductions for products which have low tariffs. In all probability, the 
formula which will be adopted will combine a linear reduction ele-
ment with a harmonization element. 
A different kind of problem is posed in the second area of the 
negotiations, that of nontariff measures. Since nontariff measures 
include the whole range of administrative and regulatory devices 
10. E. PREEG, TRADERS AND DIPLOMATS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE KENNEDY ROUND OF NEGOTIA-
TIONS UNDER THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 223, table 13-11 (1970) . 
11. Whereas a contracting party is not required to lower tariffs in the absence 
of special agreement, the general principle with respect to nontariff barriers is one of 
immediate abolition .... [E]ach type of nontariff barrier is treated separately. 
K. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 19 (1970). 
12. Text of "Declaration of Rambouillet" Issued at the Conclusion of the Meeting in 
Rambouillet, France, Nov. 17, 1975, 11 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 
1292 (1975). 
13. See E. PREEG, supra note 10, at 42-43, 61, 79-80. The first proposal to use such a 
device was made by the French in the 1950's. See A New Proposal for the Reduction of 
Customs Tariffs, GATT/1954-1. See also GATT, B.I.S.D. 2d Supp. 67 (1954), and GATT 
Docs. L/210 (1954), SR8/15 (1953), IC/SR16 (1954). 
14. Meeting of the Trade Negotiations Committee at Ministerial Level, GATT, B .I.S.D. 
13th Supp. 109-10 (1965). 
15. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, The Kennedy Round Esti-
mated Effects on Tariff Barriers, at 60-61, tables A.1, A.2, U.N. Doc. TD/6/Rev.1 (1968). 
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which are used to regulate or restrict trade, an attempt is being 
made to identify particular areas in which codes of conduct can be 
negotiated. With such codes, interested nations could establish in-
ternational rules and procedures to restrict the aspects of national 
systems which distort trade. Specific areas which have been singled 
out for the negotiation of such codes include subsidies and counter-
vailing duties, standards for government procurement, and safe-
guards. 
III. U.S.-CANADIAN AUTOMOTIVE PRODUCTS 
AGREEMENT 
Having reviewed some of the developments affecting multilat-
eral trade, I would like to turn now to bilateral relations, where the 
most important agreement affecting trade is the Agreement with 
Canada Concerning Automotive Products (Agreement).16 In the 11 
years that the Agreement has been in effect, considerable progress 
has been made toward accomplishing the objectives of the Agree-
ment, which are stated in Article I as follows: 
(a) The creation of a broader market for automotive products 
within which the full benefits of specialization and large-scale pro-
duction can be achieved; 
(b) The liberalization of United States and Canadian automotive 
trade in respect of tariff barriers and other factors tending to impede 
it, with a view to enabling the industries of both countries to partici-
pate on a fair and equitable basis in the expanding total market of 
the two countries; 
(c) The development of conditions in which market forces may 
operate effectively to attain the most economic pattern of invest-
ment, production and trade. 
Since 1965, a boom year in both countries, bilateral automotive 
trade has increased from $1.1 billion to approximately $12 billion 
in 1975, a recession year in both countries. 17 Considerable progress 
has been made in integrating what were two national industries, so 
that today there is but one. As a result, Canada now has a strong, 
efficient automobile assembly industry. 
As important as the Agreement has been as an instrument for 
16. Automotive Products Agreement, supra note 2. 
17. SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 92D CONG., 2D SESS., FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESI-
DENT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE OPERATION OF THE AUTOMOTIVE PRODUCTS TRADE ACT OF 1965, 
at 20 (Comm. Print 1972); U.S. Dep't of Commerce, United States-Canada Trade in Automo-
tive Products 1923-1974, March 11, 1975 (unpublished). 
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promoting the integration and rationalization of the North Ameri-
can automotive industry, it has also made another significant con-
tribution to U.S.-Canadian economic relations. The Agreement was 
designed in part to deal with the introduction by Canada in 1963 of 
its expanded duty remission scheme.18 This scheme in effect subsi-
dized exports to the United States by rebating tariffs on imports to 
those Canadian producers who would increase their exports of as-
sembled vehicles to the United States. 
On April 15, 1964, the Modine Manufacturing Company of Ra-
cine, Wisconsin, a producer of automobile radiators, filed a petition 
with the U.S. Commissioner of Customs under Section 303 of the 
Tariff Act of 1930, charging that the export incentive scheme consti-
tuted a bounty or grant on auto parts exported to the United States 
and requested the imposition of a 25 percent countervailing duty on 
such imports from Canada. 19 The Automobile Service Industry As-
sociation filed a brief with Customs in support of Modine's posi-
tion. 20 On June 3, 1964, the Treasury instituted an investigation to 
determine whether the scheme constituted a bounty or grant within 
the meaning of Section 303.21 
U.S. and Canadian negotiators met several times in an effort 
to hammer out an agreement in the period before January 12, 1965, 
when the Automobile Service Industry Association, together with 
four independent parts manufacturers, filed suit against the Secre-
tary of the Treasury in the Federal District Court for the District of 
Columbia asking that a writ of mandamus be issued to compel the 
Secretary to levy countervailing duties. 22 On January 16, 1965, four 
days after this suit was filed, the Agreement was signed and Canada 
dropped its duty remission scheme.23 An important concern of the 
negotiators was the possibility that imposition of countervailing 
18. The expanded duty remission scheme was put into effect by Order of Council, P.C. 
1963-1/1544, Oct. 22, 1963. See also SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 94TH CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT 
BY THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION ON THE UNITED STATES-CANADIAN AUTOMOTIVE AGREE-
MENT: !Ts HISTORY, TERMS, AND IMPACT 29, 75 (Comm. Print 1976)[hereinafter cited as ITC 
REPORT). 
19. ITC REPORT, supra note 18, at 76. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. If the Secretary of the Treasury determines that an imported product has received 
a bounty or grant, then he is authorized to impose a duty in addition to the usual duties, 
which will be equal to the net amount of such bounty or grant. Tariff Act of 1930, § 303, 19 
u.s.c. § 1303 (1970). 
23. Motor Vehicle Tariff Order, Order of Council, P.C. 1965-99, SOR/65-42, Can. Gaz., 
Jan. 27, 1965, at 143. See also ITC REPORT, supra note 18, at 77. 
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duties by the United States would lead, by a sequence of stroke and 
counterstroke, to a trade war between the two countries. 
The Agreement dispelled this concern in a very creative way. 
Under the Agreement, Canada undertook to extend duty-free treat-
ment to formerly dutiable parts and automobiles from the United 
States in exchange for duty-free treatment in the United States for 
parts and automobiles from Canada. 24 In negotiating preferential 
treatment for bilateral trade in automobiles and parts, the two par-
ties followed different approaches to reconciling conflicts between 
their undertakings under the Agreement and their international ob-
ligations under the GATT. 
Each nation had to confront the basic problem of conforming 
the Agreement to the provisions of the unconditional most-favored-
nation (MFN) clause in Article I of the GATT, which requires that 
all benefits extended by a contracting party to any one country must 
be extended unconditionally to any other contracting party. 25 The 
United States sought and obtained a waiver of the provisions of this 
clause for the Agreement under Article XXV(5) of the GATT.26 
Canada utilized a somewhat different approach in implement-
ing its part of the Agreement, and thereby successfully avoided 
having to obtain a waiver under the GATT. Duty-free treatment 
was accorded to specified new motor vehicles and original equip-
ment parts on an MFN basis to all automotive manufacturers with 
production facilities in Canada which met certain criteria. 27 As a 
result, Canada did not consider it necessary to obtain a GATT 
waiver, and did not apply for one. 
Despite the success of the Agreement, there is dissatisfaction on 
both sides of the border with it. Some critics of the Agreement 
erroneously view trade under the Agreement as a zero-sum situa-
tion, instead of one from which both sides can benefit. The Automo-
tive Parts Manufacturers Association of Canada would like to have 
the Agreement amended so as to provide more protection for the 
24. Automotive Products Agreement, supra note 2, art. II, annex A. 
25. GATI, supra note 1, art. 1(1). See also id., preamble, art. Il(l)(a). 
26. See GATI, B.l.S.D. 14th Supp. 37, 181 (1965). Article XXV of the GATI, supra note 
1, states in pertinent part: 
5. In exceptional circumstances not elsewhere provided for in this Agreement, the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES may waive an obligation imposed upon a contracting party by 
this Agreement; Provided that any such decision shall be approved by a two-thirds 
majority of the votes cast and that such majority shall comprise more than half of 
the contracting parties. 
27. Order of Council, P .C. 1966-1509, SOR/66-370, Can. Gaz., Aug. 24, 1966, at 1075. 
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Canadian parts industry and to ensure that Canadian products will 
capture a larger share of the North American market. 
In the United States, a report prepared by the International 
Trade Commission (ITC)(formerly the Tariff Commission) concern-
ing the Agreement was released by the Senate Finance Committee. 28 
In this report, the ITC concluded that "[t]he agreement as imple-
mented by Canada is not a free-trade agreement, and it has prima-
rily benefited the Canadian economy."29 The report criticized the 
Agreement on the following grounds: (1) Canada failed to remove 
the transitional provisions which imposed certain limitations on 
duty-free entry;30 (2) the actual commitments made by Canada did 
not involve any real concessions, but rather in effect continued the 
preexisting system without substantial change;31 and (3) the trade 
surplus in favor of the United States was due to the weakness of the 
U.S. economy in the past few years, so that as the economy im-
proved, the surplus would decline. 32 
In response to these criticisms, the United States and Canada 
recently have agreed to initiate in-depth studies of the long-term 
outlook for the North American automotive industry. These evalua-
tions could provide a basis for consideration of options for future 
policies. 
IV. TRADE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 
A. Trade Act of 1974 
The discussion of national laws for the regulation of foreign 
trade will concentrate on U.S. laws. The most important recent 
development in the United States was the passage of the Trade Act 
of 1974.33 This law revamped the entire system by which U.S. trade 
policy is formulated and implemented. Among other things, the 
Trade Act: (1) provides authority for the President to negotiate and 
enter into bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, 34 (2) estab-
lishes new procedures for congressional enactment of bills to imple-
ment trade agreements dealing with non tariff barriers, 35 (3) estab-
28. ITC REPORT, supra note 18. 
29. Id. at 51. 
30. Id. at 32-34. 
31. Id. at 50. 
32. Id. at 49. 
33. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified in scattered sections 
of 5, 13, 19, 26, 28, 31 U.S.C.). 
34. Trade Act of 1974, § 101, 19 U.S.C. § 2111 (Supp. IV, 1974). 
35. Trade Act of 1974, § 151, 19 U.S.C. § 2191 (Supp. IV, 1974). 
7
Gadbaw: U .S.-Canadian Trade
Published by SURFACE, 1977
344 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 4:337 
lishes new rules and procedures for relief to U.S. industries which 
are injured by increased imports36 or the unfair trade practices of 
foreign nations, 37 ( 4) establishes a new framework for trade with the 
socialist countries, 38 and ( 5) extends the Generalized System of Pref-
erences to the developing countries. 39 
This review of U.S. law will focus on four specific provisions 
which have aroused some concern about the U.S. commitment to a 
liberal trade policy. They are: (1) the "escape clause,"40 (2) Section 
301;" (3) the countervailing duty law, 42 and (4) the antidumping 
law. 43 
Most of the recent cases have been brought under the anti-
dumping, countervailing duty, or escape clause provisions. These 
measures, now modified by the Trade Act of 1974, have been in force 
for many years, and are explicitly recognized in international agree-
ments of the United States as legitimate grounds for intervening in 
trade. Of the more than 50 cases initiated under these laws in 1975, 
dumping duties were imposed in only one case and countervailing 
duties in five cases. 44 Thus, in only six cases out of 50 was relief 
granted to a domestic industry. No relief was granted under escape 
clause legislation in 1975. From this record of the first full year 
under the Trade Act, it is fair to conclude that these provisions have 
not been used to impose unwarranted protectionist measures. The 
following review will examine the operation of these provisions and 
highlight the important changes made by the Trade Act. Trade 
cases with special importance for U.S.-Canadian trade will also be 
analyzed. 
36. Trade Act of 1974, §§ 201-03, 19 U.S.C . §§ 2251-53 (Supp. IV, 1974), formerly Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, §§ 301-02, 76 Stat. 883-85. 
37. Trade Act of 1974, §§ 301-02, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-12 (Supp. IV, 1974). 
38. Trade Act of 1974, §§ 401 et seq., 19 U.S.C. §§ 2431 et seq. (Supp. IV, 1974). 
39. Trade Act of 1974, §§ 501 et seq., 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461 et seq. (Supp. IV, 1974). 
40. Trade Act of 1974, § 201, 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (Supp. IV, 1974), formerly Trade Expan-
sion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 301, 76 Stat. 883. 
41. Trade Act of 1974, § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (Supp. IV, 1974). 
42. Trade Act of 1974, § 331, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1303, 1516 (Supp. IV, 1974), amending Tariff 
Act of 1930, §§ 303, 516, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1303, 1516 (1970). 
43. Trade Act of 1974, § 321, 19 U.S.C. §§ 160, 162-64, 170a(3) (Supp. IV, 1974), 
amending Antidumping Act of 1921, §§ 201-12, 406-07, 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-73 (1970). 
44. Antidumping duties were imposed on Birch 3 Ply Doorskins from Japan, 41 Fed. Reg. 
7389 (1976) (to be codified in 19 C.F.R. § 153.43) . Countervailing duties were imposed on: 
Float Glass from Italy, 41 Fed. Reg. 1274 (1976) (to be codified in 19 C.F.R. § 159.47(f)); 
Footwear from Taiwan, 41 Fed. Reg. 1298 (1976) (to be codified in 19 C.F.R. § 159.47(f)); 
Leather Handbags from Brazil, 41 Fed. Reg. 1741 (1976) (to be codified in 19 C.F.R. § 
159.47(f)); Nonrubber Footwear from Korea, 41 Fed. Reg. 1588 (1976) (to be codified in 19 
C.F.R. § 159.47(f)); and Castor Oil Products from Brazil, 41 Fed. Reg. 11018 (1976) (to be 
codified in 19 C.F.R. § 159.47(f)). 
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B. Import Relief 
Section 201 of the Trade Act replaces the provisions of the 
Trade Expansion Act of 196245 with a new escape clause provision. 46 
Essentially, this provision permits the President to restrict importa-
tion of any product which causes, or threatens to cause, serious 
injury to a domestic U.S. industry. Although this involves the sus-
pension of obligations undertaken in the GATT, such action is per-
missible under Article XIX of the GATT, provided the injury is 
caused by increased imports which are "a result of unforeseen devel-
opments and of the effect of the obligations incurred by a contract-
ing party under this Agreement."47 
The Trade Act makes several important changes in the prior 
U.S. escape clause provisions: 
1. It is no longer necessary to establish a link between conces-
sions granted under trade agreements and increased imports. 48 
2. The increased imports need no longer be the major factor 
causing serious injury to the domestic producer. Rather, they need 
only be a substantial cause, defined as "a cause which is important 
and not less than any other cause."49 
3. Import relief may be granted for a five-year period, with one 
extension for three years, if necessary. However, relief is, to the 
extent feasible, to be phased down no later than after the first three 
years. 50 
4. In the event the President decides on import relief other 
than that recommended by the ITC, or refuses to provide any relief, 
the Congress may override that decision and impose the ITC recom-
mendation by a concurrent resolution of both Houses. 51 
There have been 15 actions brought under the escape clause 
45. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 301, 76 Stat. 883 (repealed by 
Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 602(d), 88 Stat. 2072). 
46. Trade Act of 1974, § 201, 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (Supp. IV, 1974). 
47. GATI, supra note 1, art. XIX(l). 
48. Compare Trade Act of 1974, § 201, 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (Supp. IV, 1974), with Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962, § 301(b)(l), 19 U.S.C. § 1901(b)(l) (1970). 
49. Compare Trade Act of 1974, § 201(b)(l), (4), 19 U.S.C. § 225l(b)(l), (4) (Supp. IV, 
1974), with Trade Expansion Act of 1962, § 30l(b)(3), 19 U.S.C. § 1901(b)(3) (1970)(repealed 
1974). 
50. Trade Act of 1974, § 203(h)(l), (3), 19 U.S.C. § 2253(h)(l), (3) (Supp. IV, 1974). The 
1962 Act provided a four-year period of relief, with an extension of up to four years available, 
with no provision for a phase-down. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, § 351(c)(l)(B), (2), 19 
U.S.C. § 1981(c)(l)(B), (2) (1970)(amended 1974). 
51. Trade Act of 1974, § 203(c)(l), 19 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(l) (Supp. IV, 1974). This provi-
sion essentially restated that in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, § 351(a)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 
1981(a)(2)(1970). 
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since January 1975, of which four have resulted in negative determi-
nations.52 In two cases, there were tie votes in the ITC.53 Under the 
procedures of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 54 the President 
chose to consider the ITC decision a negative one in both cases and 
thereby refused to impose import relief on the grounds that the 
imports did not substantially cause injury to domestic producers.55 
Of the remaining cases, the most important involve specialty 
steel and footwear. On January 16, 1976, the ITC reported to the 
President its determination that the domestic producers of stainless 
and alloy tool steel were eligible for import relief because they met 
the criteria set forth in the Trade Act.56 U.S. imports of these prod-
ucts were about $200 million in 1975, principally from Japan, Swe-
den, and the European Economic Community.57 The ITC recom-
mended import relief in the form of remedial quotas for five years, 
with their level based on the 1970-74 average imports.58 On March 
16, President Gerald R. Ford announced his decision to order the 
Special Representative for Trade Negotiations to attempt "to nego-
tiate orderly marketing agreements with supplying countries."59 If 
such agreements could not be negotiated, the President would then 
impose "import quotas for a period of three years to take effect on 
or before June 14, 1976."60 President Ford also announced his deci-
sion to negotiate a sector agreement on steel in the Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations at Geneva. 61 Agreement was subsequently 
52. Negative injury determinations were issued on: Birch Three-Ply Door Skins from 
Japan, 41 Fed. Reg. 2690 (1976); Wrapper Tobacco, 40 Fed. Reg. 52668 (1975); Bolts, Nuts, 
and Screws Made from Iron or Steel, 40 Fed. Reg. 55721 (1975); and Work Gloves, 41 Fed. 
Reg. 10965 (1976). 
53. Tie votes occurred with Asparagus, Fresh, Chilled or Frozen, 41 Fed. Reg. 3787 
(1976); and Slide Fasteners, 41 Fed. Reg. 8433 (1976). 
54. Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1953, § 201, 19 U.S.C. § 1330(d)(l) (1970), 
amending Tariff Act of 1930, § 330, 19 U.S.C. § 1330 (1970). 
55. Asparagus Imports: Presidential Determination of No Injury, 41 Fed. Reg. 10976 
(1976); Slide Fasteners and Parts: Imports not a Substantial Cause of Injury to the U.S. 
Industry, 41 Fed. Reg. 17829 (1976). 
56. U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, STAINLESS STEEL AND ALLOY TOOL STEEL; 
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON INVESTIGATION No. TA-201-5 UNDER SECTION 201 OF THE TRADE 
ACT OF 1974, at 3 (1976)[hereinafter cited as REPORT ON STAINLESS STEEL]. 
57. Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, Press Release No. 220 
and Fact Sheet, March 16, 1976. Of total imports of specialty steel, 51 percent by volume 
comes from Japan, 18.6 percent from the European Economic Community, and 14.8 percent 
from Sweden. U.S. Customs, Publication IM 146, Dec. 1975. 
58. REPORT ON STAINLESS STEEL, supra note 56, at 4-6. 
59. Memorandum of March 16, 1976, Import Relief Determination Under Section 202(b) 
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reached with Japan to limit imports; however, as no agreement was 
reached with other countries, import relief was imposed against 
them under Section 203 of the Trade Act in the form of quantitative 
import restrictions. 62 
The other important escape clause decision involved imports of 
non-rubber footwear. On February 20, 1976, the ITC announced its 
affirmative determination of injury covering 1975 imports of $1.12 
billion.63 President Ford had until April 20 to make his decision 
regarding relief under the 60-day limit of Section 202(b) of the 
Trade Act. He decided that adjustment assistance to firms, rather 
than import relief, was the appropriate remedy, since the latter 
would have lessened competition and raised prices.64 
C. Unfair Trade Practices 
Title III of the Trade Act of 1974 sets out a number of different 
procedures for dealing with what are referred to as unfair trade 
practices. 65 Three of the most significant developments involve: (1) 
Section 301,66 (2) the countervailing duty law,67 and (3) the anti-
dumping law. 68 
1. SECTION 301 
Section 301 of the Trade Act gives the President new authority 
to respond to unjustifiable or unreasonable foreign restrictions on 
U.S. trade, including trade in goods and services. Section 301 was 
intended to replace Section 252 of the Trade Expansion Act of 
1962, 69 under which the President had only limited authority to 
retaliate against "unfair" practices of foreign countries, and which 
was used only once, in the infamous "Chicken War."70 Among the 
62. Pres. Proc. No. 4445, 41 Fed. Reg. 24101 (1976). 
63. U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, FOOTWEAR; REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON 
INVESTIGATION No. TA-201-7 UNDER SECTION 201 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974, at 3 (1976). 
64. Memorandum of April 16, 1976, Import Relief Determination Under Section 202(b) 
of the Trade Act, 41 Fed. Reg. 16545 (1976). 
65. Trade Act of 1974, §§ 301-31 (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.) 
66. Trade Act of 1974, § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (Supp. IV, 1974). 
67. Trade Act of 1974, § 331, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1303, 1516 (Supp. IV, 1974), amending Tariff 
Act of 1930, §§ 303, 516, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1303, 1516 (1970). 
68. Trade Act of 1974, § 321, 19 U.S.C. §§ 160, 162-64, 170a(3) (Supp. IV, 1974), 
amending Antidumping Act of 1921, §§ 201-12, 406-07, 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-73 (1970). 
69. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 252, 76 Stat. 879 (repealed by 
Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 602(d), 88 Stat. 2072). 
70. The "Chicken War" was the first major dispute between the United States and the 
European Economic Community (EEC). The dispute centered on the EEC's Common Agri-
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practices covered by the new law are foreign subsidies of exports to 
third-country markets which compete unfairly with U.S. exports, 71 
and unreasonable restrictions on access to supplies of food, raw 
materials, or manufactured or semimanufactured products.72 There 
were five pending Section 301 investigations at the time of this 
Symposium. 73 
In an important development under Section 301, the only case 
involving trade with Canada was successfully terminated on March 
4, 1976. This case gives some indication of the pattern which these 
cases are likely to follow. On July 17, 1975, the United Egg Produ-
cers filed a petition with the Special Representative for Trade Nego-
tiations, charging that the Canadian quota on the import of eggs 
from the United States was an unfair trade practice under Section 
301 of the Trade Act.74 Public hearings were held on the complaint. 
After bilateral efforts to resolve the dispute failed, the United States 
asked for an advisory opinion from the GATT. A GATT working 
party, formed at the request of the United States, decided in De-
cember 1975 that the quota appeared to be consistent with Article 
XI, although it stated that a more representative base period could 
have been used in setting the quota level. 75 The working party de-
clined to speculate whether tariff agreements had been nullified or 
impaired. Bilateral negotiations were resumed, and the United 
States and Canada finally reached an agreement whereby the im-
cultural Policy (CAP). The United States complained that the CAP violated U.S. rights 
under the GATT by restricting imports of frozen chickens without regard to tariff concessions 
which West Germany had granted prior to the formation of the EEC. The complaint was 
considered by a GATT panel which authorized the United States to retaliate against $26 
million worth of trade from the EEC by suspending the application of benefits of a trade 
concession agreement with the EEC. See 1 A. CHAVES, T. EHRLICH, & A. LowENFELD, INTERNA-
TIONAL LEGAL PROCESS 249-306 (1968); Walker, Dispute Settlement: The Chicken War, 58 AM. 
J. INT'L L. 671 (1964); Lowenfeld, Doing Unto Others . .. The Chicken War Ten Years After, 
4 J. MARITIME L. & CoM. 599 (1973) . The most recent dispute of this nature resulted in a 
similar suspension for brandy imports, followed by the imposition of an import duty. Pres. 
Proc. No. 4478, Nov. 26, 1976, 12 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1692 
(1976). 
71. Trade Act of 1974, § 301(a)(3), 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(3) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
72. Trade Act of 1974, § 301(a)(4), 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(4) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
73. Of these, the Delta Steamship Lines investigation was terminated at the request of 
the petitioner on June 29, 1976. The petitioner had alleged that Guatemala was engaged in 
discriminatory cargo preference practices. 41 Fed. Reg. 26758 (1976). No decision has yet been 
reached in any of the other four cases, all involving trade policies of the EEC. 
74. 40 Fed. Reg. 33749 (1975). 
75. 41 Fed. Reg. 9430 (1976). 
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port quota was enlarged to 100,000 cases of shell eggs, approxi-
mately twice the level originally imposed. 76 
2. COUNTERVAILING DUTIES 
Section 331 of the Trade Act makes some important changes in 
the U.S. countervailing duty law. Under this provision, the Secre-
tary of the Treasury is required to determine whether imported 
articles are the recipients of a bounty or grant. 77 If this is deter-
mined, countervailing duties must be imposed on such imported 
items in the amount of the bounty or grant. 78 
The amendments made by the Trade Act include the imposi-
tion of strict time limits for countervailing duty determinations. A 
preliminary determination must be made within six months after an 
investigation is initiated, and a final determination must be made 
within one year. 79 
A second change has made the law applicable for the first time 
to duty-free imports, provided a finding of injury to an industry in 
the United States is made by the ITC.80 It is important to note that 
this injury finding is necessary to make U.S. law consistent with our 
GATT obligations. Under Article VI of the GATT, an injury deter-
mination must be made before countervailing duties can be im-
posed.81 However, this provision does not apply to the United States 
with respect to dutiable items because the relevant provisions of the 
Tariff Act of 1930 predate the GATT, and by the terms of the 
Protocol of Provisional Application, the GATT is applied only inso-
far as it is consistent with existing national legislation.82 
76. Id. 
77. Trade Act of 1974, § 331, 19 U.S.C . § 1303 (Supp. IV, 1974), amending Tariff Act of 
1930, § 303, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1970) . 
78. Id. 
79. Trade Act of 1974, § 331(a), 19 U.S.C . § 1303(a)(4) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
80. Trade Act of 1974, § 331(a), 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(2), (b)(l), (3) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
81. Article Vl(6)(a) of the GATT states: 
No contracting party shall levy any anti-dumping or countervailing duty on the 
importation of any product of the territory of another contracting party unless it 
determines that the effect of the dumping or subsidization, as the case may be, is 
such as to cause or threaten material injury to an established domestic industry, or 
is such as to retard materially the establishment of a domestic industry. 
82. "No GATT Contracting Party applies GATT 'definitively.' ... GATT is applied by 
the Protocol of Provisional Application or a similar commitment (through succession or 
protocol of accession) and, consequently, portions of GATT are subject to 'existing legisla-
tion.'" J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 799 (1969). In the case of the United 
States, "existing legislation" refers to legislation in existence on October 30, 1947. Under 
Paragraph l(b) of the Protocol, Part II of the GATT (including antidumping and countervail-
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A third significant change in U.S. law is designed to encourage 
the negotiation of a code to restrict the use of subsidies.83 The Secre-
tary of the Treasury is authorized to suspend the application of 
countervailing duties during the four-year period ending January 3, 
1979, provided: (1) adequate steps have been taken to reduce sub-
stantially or eliminate the adverse effect upon domestic producers 
of the bounty or grant, 84 (2) there is a reasonable prospect that trade 
agreements on nontariff barriers will be entered into under Section 
102 of the Trade Act, 85 and (3) the imposition of countervailing 
duties would be likely to jeopardize seriously the satisfactory com-
pletion of such negotiations. 86 
The fourth change in U.S. law expressly provides for judicial 
review of negative ITC determinations by the Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals. 87 This change was a specific response to the 1971 
decision of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in United 
States v. Hammond Lead Products, Inc. , 88 where it was held that 
judicial review of negative countervailing duty determinations was 
not available to domestic producers, as the duty constituted a penal 
sanction which Congress did not intend the courts to impose. 
What has been the experience under the law in 1975? Of the 38 
cases initiated, nine countervailing duty cases involving 1974 trade 
values of $585 million resulted in affirmative decisions. Of these, 
countervailing duties were actually imposed in five cases involving 
1974 trade volume of $200 million. 89 In four cases, countervailing 
duties were waived under the Secretary's authority to do so pending 
negotiations. 90 
ing duties, Article VI; national treatment, Article III; and subsidies; Article XVI) is to be 
applied only where "not inconsistent with existing legislation." Protocol of Provisional Appli-
cation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, done Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A2051 
(1948), T .l.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 308 (effective Jan. 1, 1948). 
83. Trade Act of 1974, § 331(a), 19 U.S.C. § 1303(d)(l)(Supp. IV, 1974). 
84. Trade Act of 1974, § 331(a) , 19 U.S.C . § 1303(d)(2)(A) (Supp. IV, 1974) . 
85. Trade Act of 1974, § 331(a), 19 U.S.C. § 1303(d)(2)(B) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
86. Trade Act of 1974, § 331(a), 19 U.S.C. § 1303(d)(2)(C) (Supp. IV, 1974) . 
87. Trade Act of 1974, § 341(a), 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (Supp. IV, 1974), amending Tariff 
Act of 1930, § 337(c), 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c)(1970). 
88. 440 F.2d 1024 (C.C.P.A. 1971) . 
89. For the five cases in which countervailing duties were imposed, see note 44 supra. 
90. The Secretary exercised his waiver authority in: Dairy Products from the EEC, 40 
Fed. Reg. 21720 (1975) (to be codified in 19 C.F.R. § 159.47(f)); Cheese from Austria, 41 Fed. 
Reg. 1275 (1976) (to be codified in 19 C.F.R. § 159.47(f)); Cheese from Switzerland, 41 Fed. 
Reg. 1468 (1976) (to be codified in 19 C.F.R. § 159.47(f)); and Canned Hams from the EEC, 
40 Fed. Reg. 55639 (1975) (to be codified in 19 C.F.R. § 159.47(f)) . 
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Several of these cases directly involved trade with Canada. A 
case involving oxygen-sensing probes was terminated.91 In another 
case, involving glass beads, a final determination which imposed 
countervailing duties was made on September 2, 1976.92 This case 
involved the important issue of regional development aids, which 
aroused a great deal of controversy in the case of imports of Michelin 
radial tires to the United States from Canada.93 
A number of negative determinations appear to be headed for 
challenge under procedures available to domestic producers. There 
are presently six actions pending in the Customs Court. The most 
significant is the suit commenced by U.S. Steel Corporation, which 
challenges the Treasury's decision not to impose countervailing du-
ties to counteract rebates of value-added taxes on steel products 
from Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom, and West Germany. 94 
This suit questions a 70-year old Treasury policy that rebates 
of indirect taxes directly related to the exported product do not 
constitute bounties or grants. There are several billion dollars in 
trade which would be directly affected by this case. Moreover, be-
cause of the prevalence of tax rebate practices, the implications of 
the case are even broader. It should be noted that there are some 
niceties in the procedures of the Customs Court which permit U.S. 
Steel Corporation to commence its action by filing a summons.95 
U.S. Steel now has up to two years to file a complaint, but as yet it 
has not done so. 
The seriousness of the problem posed by different national poli-
cies on subsidies and countervailing duties has led to renewed ef-
forts by the United States to negotiate an international code which 
91. 40 Fed. Reg. 57813 (1975). 
92. 41 Fed. Reg. 37103 (1976)(to be codified in 19 C.F.R. § 159.47(f)). 
93. X-Radial Steel Belted Tires from Canada, 38 Fed. Reg. 1018 (1973) . In this case, 
Michelin Tire Manufacturing Co. of Canada, Ltd. received grants and tax benefits provided 
by the government of Canada and obtained grants and loans from the province of Nova 
Scotia. Michelin exported a large proportion of its output to the United States. The U.S. 
Commissioner of Customs determined that these exports benefited from bounties or grants 
within the meaning of Section 303 and imposed countervailing duties . An appeal of the 
decision by importers is now pending, Michelin Tire Corp. v. United States, No. 75-9-02467 
(Cust. Ct., filed Oct. 6, 1975). 
This administrative decision is not to be confused with the case of Michelin Tire Corp. 
v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976), which tested the validity of a local ad valorem property tax 
imposed on imported tires by a county in Georgia . See notes 106-12 infra and accompanying 
text. 
94. U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States, No. 76-2-0045 (Cust. Ct., filed Feb . 18, 1976). 
95. CusT. CT. R. 3.2(a). 
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would limit the use of subsidies and revise the rules and procedures 
for countervailing duties. Proposals to this effect are being discussed 
in Geneva and could result in a subsidies and countervailing duty 
code in the near future. 
3. ANTIDUMPING 
The last measure of note against unfair trade practices is the 
amended Antidumping Act of 1921.96 Essentially, dumping is price 
discrimination between national markets. Dumping is usually de-
fined as the practice of charging less for export sales than for the 
same goods sold domestically. Under U.S. law, a domestic industry 
that is injured by such a practice can obtain relief in the form of a 
duty which is equal to the difference between the price on the U.S. 
market and the price on the domestic market. 97 
The Trade Act tightens the provisions of the Antidumping Act 
by imposing time limits for determinations of dumping by the Sec-
retary of the Treasury.98 An initial determination must be made 
within six months after the publication of notice of an antidumping 
proceeding (nine months for complicated cases), and a final deter-
mination must be made three months thereafter. The Trade Act 
provides U.S. manufacturers, producers, and wholesalers with an 
automatic right to appear at antidumping hearings, 99 and provides 
for judicial review of negative Treasury determinations. 100 
There have been 18 cases initiated under the Antidumping Act 
since January 1975, covering a total of $7 .52 billion in import 
trade. 101 One of these, the largest import dumping case in history, 
could have had significant implications for U.S.-Canadian trade. 
This case was initiated by a petition from Congressman John Dent 
and the United Auto Workers, and charged that automobiles from 
Western Europe, Japan, and Canada were being dumped in the 
United States. The total import value of trade at issue was $7.49 
billion, including $3.0 billion in imports from Canada. 102 However, 
96. Trade Act of 1974, § 321, 19 U.S.C. §§ 160, 162-64, 170a(3) (Supp. IV, 1974), 
amending Antidumping Act of 1921, §§ 201-12, 406-07, 19 U.S.C . §§ 160-73 (1970). 
97. Antidumping Act of 1921, § 202, 19 U.S.C. § 161 (1970). 
98. Trade Act of 1974, § 321(a)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 160(b) (Supp. IV, 1974), amending 
Antidumping Act of 1921, § 201, 19 U.S.C. § 160 (1970). 
99. Trade Act of 1974, § 321(a)(2), 19 U.S .C. § 160(d)(l)(A) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
100. Trade Act of 1974, § 321(f)(l), 19 U.S .C. § 1516(d) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
101. See SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE POLICY AND THE TRADE ACT OF 1974, at 31-32 (Comm. Print 1976). 
102. Id. 
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the Treasury Department announced on August 18, 1976 that it was 
discontinuing its investigation. 103 In another antidumping case af-
fecting Canada, an action was commenced in December 1975 in-
volving industrial vehicle tires. Imports from Canada in 1974 
amounted to $500,000. 104 The Treasury Department issued a deter-
mination on August 18, 1976 that the tires were not being sold at 
less than fair value, so no import relief was granted. 105 
V. MICHELIN TIRE CORP. V. WAGES 
Finally, I would like to refer briefly to the recent United States 
Supreme Court case of Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 106 which dem-
onstrates the importance of state and local laws in affecting trade 
flows between the United States and Canada. The Supreme Court 
held that the State of Georgia could impose, without violating the 
Import-Export Clause of the Constitution, 107 a nondiscriminatory ad 
valorem property tax on tires imported from France and Canada 
which were held in a warehouse for distribution. 
In this case, a county in Georgia assessed an ad valorem prop-
erty tax against imported tires in Michelin's inventory in a whole-
sale distribution warehouse from which 300 dealers in six states were 
serviced. The question presented to the Court was whether this tax 
assessment was contrary to the constitutional prohibition that 
"[n]o State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Im-
posts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be abso-
lutely necessary for executing its inspection laws .... " 108 Twenty-
five percent of the tires came overland from Canada; the remainder 
came by ocean container from France and Canada. 109 At the ware-
house they were sorted by size and stacked in inventory for distribu-
tion. 
The Court held that the tires were no longer in transit. no The 
warehouse was operated no differently than a distribution ware-
house utilized by a wholesaler dealing wholly in domestic goods. 
Under the circumstances, the tax, which did not discriminate 
103. Automobiles from Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Sweden, United King-
dom, and West Germany, 41 Fed. Reg. 34982-90 (1976). 
104. SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, supra note 101, at 32. 
105. Industrial Vehicle Tires From Canada, 41 Fed. Reg. 34990 (1976). 
106. 423 U.S. 276 (1976). 
107. Id. at 279. 
108. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. 
109. 423 U.S. at 280. 
110. Id. at 302. 
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against imports, was not prohibited by the Import-Export Clause. 111 
In so holding, the Court overruled the century-old decision in Low 
v. Austin. 112 
The decision of the Court is entirely consistent with the inter-
national obligations of the United States, which require only that 
national treatment be accorded to imports and exports. While the 
decision may prompt some states to extend the application of cer-
tain taxes to cover imports, the net effect should not adversely affect 
the competitiveness of imports in the U.S. market. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This review of the national and international laws affecting 
U.S.-Canadian trade has clearly illustrated the dynamic and com-
plex system of laws through which national economic policies are 
implemented. While great progress has been made in the reduction 
of trade barriers, there are still a number of serious problems which 
need to be addressed. I am convinced that success in solving these 
problems will depend in large part on the ability of lawyers to devise 
principles and techniques for furthering economic cooperation. 
111. Id. at 279. 
112. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 29 (1871). 
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